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Copyright © International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). All rights reserved. ( Source of the document: ICC Digital Library )
I think you will agree I did not exaggerate when I initially introduced our three speakers and spoke of their talents and experience in the world of arbitration.
It has been suggested that I should sum up the results of this Session-an effort I have already classified as 'hazardous'. But bear with me for a few minutes.
Although the overall theme of our meeting is Arbitration in the next decade, Mr Hulbert rightly emphasized that it was fruitful to look at the past as providing the 'basis for any assessment of what may be expected in the coming decade'. So too, Professor Bernardini referred to the origins of 'arbitral justice', of its history from Roman times, through the medieval period and up to today. That history, he said, has been marked by the attitude of states and their courts regarding the acceptability of this alternative method of rendering justice. And so, he brought us directly to the theme of this seminar and likewise to Mr Derains' analysis of the differences, today, in the approaches of judges and arbitrators to the application of 'the law,' of 'public policy' and the development of 'case law', or precedent.
It has been interesting to consider the parallelism in the papers of Mr Hulbert and Professor Bernardini as they describe the developing 'respectability' of arbitration in the differing legal systems they deal with. In the USA, the courts originally would refuse to enforce even an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute. In similar vein, Professor Bernardini refers to the 'measure of hostility' shown by state laws and courts to arbitration, and their efforts to limit the freedom and autonomy of arbitration, which they tended to view 'as a derogation to state jurisdiction'.
As indicated by both these speakers, pressures from the business world gradually led to a softening of this attitude, and we saw the growth of private arbitration under the auspices of trade groups and chambers of commerce. There was legislation in the USA as early as 1925. There were the Geneva Conventions of 1923 and 1927. Greatest pressure came after the Second World War with the growth of international trade, leading, in both the USA and many European countries, to 'the emergence of arbitration as an acceptable alternative to state jurisdiction'. Internationally we had the New York Convention of 1958, signed now by 120 states. Professor Bernardini notes also the European states which have enacted arbitration laws in recent years-in a 'sort of competition in ensuring the best possible legal environment for arbitration within their own territory'-a development assisted by the use of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Mr Hulbert gives a striking summary when he says that '. . . binding arbitral awards issued by ad hoc tribunals, which with only modest exaggeration can be described as largely composed of amateurs, proceeding confidentially, pursuant to no detailed rules of procedure, and subject to only marginal judicial review, are more readily entitled to enforcement in most countries of the world than the decisions of professional judges, rendered after public proceedings pursuant to established procedural codes and subject to correction on appeal'!
But both he and Professor Bernardini go on to utter a note of caution. It would not be the ideal, the latter says, to sever entirely the relationship between the courts and arbitration and leave the latter to 'float alone in transnational space'. The critical areas are assistance and control. Both are subjected to careful analysis, particularly on the question of jurisdiction, interim and conservatory measures, corrections and interpretation, etc.
As Professor Bemardini concludes, 'The last twenty years have seen the progressive recognition by national legislators and courts that arbitration . . . is a method of dispute settlement particularly suited in the context of trade and industrial relations. This policy favouring arbitration is even more developed . . . in the transnational space.' The arbitrators have increased autonomy to order provisional or conservatory measures, and the enlarged cooperation by state courts in support of the arbitral proceedings has increased the efficacy of arbitration, a tendency reinforced by much recent legislation.
But attention. Mr Hulbert cautions that this very success of international arbitration may contain within it 'the seeds of a possible reaction'. Again, it is curious-or rather striking-the way our first two speakers move towards similar conclusions. The belief that the progress so made is only an 'intermediate step towards the acquiring by arbitration of a fully autonomous status misconceives the reality of the institution' (Bernardini). 'To the extent that this development substitutes arbitration for conventional litigation in national courts, the more likely it is that arbitration will be subject to increasingly rigorous scrutiny . . .' (Hulbert) (In this context, members of the Arbitration Court have noted the increasing 'legalization' of arbitration). Mr Hulbert has raised the possibility or desirability of uniform and detailed procedural rules for international arbitration. He queries whether claims under important domestic statutes designed broadly to protect individual rights can be left to be decided by arbitration, with its lack of detailed rules and limited possibilities for review of errors of fact or law. There is, he says, perhaps a danger that there might come pressure for a uniform set of rules for the conduct of international arbitration, or at the least the importation into arbitration of certain procedures well known in litigation, including a more extensive system of review. Professor Bemardini urges caution in making arbitration more like ordinary litigation-there is the danger it would 'become tainted by the same formalism and procedural burdens of the proceedings before the national judge . . .'
And so we come then to the aspect of our problem dealt with by Mr Derains-the difference between the positions or roles of judge and arbitrator-and as he demonstrates, they are essentially different in an important number of ways. As he says, for example, they have different sources of authority, and they approach the various aspects of public policy in different ways. He touches on the notion of 'arbitration case law' as an interesting possibility.
Professor Bernardini concludes arbitration should be content with the 'present status of the complementarity of roles between judge and arbitrator as provided by national legislators and which the majority of national judges have chosen to interpret in a way . . . which is supportive of arbitration'. 'Progress can be made,' he adds, 'in improving the cooperation between judges and arbitrators . . .'
I would close on this relatively hopeful note, emphasising the experience we have had on our Court. There have been occasions when we have had to accept the resignation of arbitrators because they have been appointed judges. On the other hand, in recent years many judges or retired judges have been appointed ICC arbitrators. They come from a wide range of countries: the USA, Canada, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand and the nations of Scandinavia, to mention a few. The former General Counsel of the Court is now a judge of the Court of Appeals in Paris. And last, but certainly not least, we are honoured to have Lord Mustill as a Vice-Chair, after a career as lawyer, member of the highest court in England, and now distinguished arbitrator.
In the light of such intermingling of the judicial and arbitral, I am hopeful that international arbitration and, in particular, our own Court, now well over the 10 000 level of cases, will continue to thrive, and not only over the next decade.
Finally, I would ask you to join with me in thanking our distinguished speakers for their stimulating contributions to our debate.